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Abstract 
This is a historical study that utilises primary evidences from Tanzania National Archives (TNA) to examine the 
compulsion marketing policies of the Wachagga, the small-scale native coffee producers in the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro aimed to fill a knowledge gap in the existing literature which tends to ignore. Importantly, this is a 
shift from some authors who attempted to document the policy by reliance on the colonial authority’s sources 
that proved bias and distorting. This therefore, is primarily to contribute to a new knowledge and understanding 
of the policies. The policies imposed by the Tanzania’s colonial authority under Section 36 of the 1932 co-
operative legislation that, the colonial authority, was doubtful to employ and enforce it given the fact the settlers 
were trapped just the same as the native growers who were compelled to sell their coffee through a native 
organisation, the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU). Instead, in 1934 a new legislation, the 
Chagga Rule was passed by the Chagga Council which was the Native Authority to compel only native growers 
to sell coffee on the one hand and to exclude European planters on the other. In 1937 the native growers resisted 
and rioted against the legislation and demanded to sell their produce in the free market as they established that 
the legislation was not in their favour due to poor price paid to them. In response,  the colonial authority 
revoked the Chagga Rule, but increased their grip over native produced coffee through the Native Coffee 
(Control and Marketing) Ordinance, 1937, which became integral part of the marketing policy and granted the 
Moshi Native Coffee Board (MNCB) and Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU) monopoly over the 
native produced coffee.   
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1.1: The Background 
Coffee farming on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro was introduced by Missionaries in 1898 during the German 
colonial rule.1 Coffee production kept on expanding further year after year; and this was partly due to the 
establishment of coffee plantation owned by the settlers who employed natives as labourers and trained growers 
in the appropriate cultivation techniques.2 The improved coffee farming methods were also employed by the 
natives that led to the improvement of production in the farms.  
However, the development of the crop was disrupted during the First World War when the growers 
abandoned production it due to lack of market. The settlers most of whom were German fled the country during 
the war, thus their plantation were abandoned too. However, the Greeks and some Indians planters continued 
with production. In 1919 the British colonial government began providing support to small-scale WaChagga 
coffee growers in an attempt to revive the industry3 which was implemented by Sir Charles Cecil Farquharson 
Dundas4 when he was the DC of Moshi (1919 to 1924)5 not only for export but also to enable growers to pay 
poll tax.6  His efforts were very successful that he was honoured as Wasahuye O Wachagga i.e. elder grandfather 
of WaChagga.7  
In an effort to revive the industry among the natives, Dundas, accompanied by Joseph Merinyo, an 
employee in the Administration Department visited and had meetings with growers from 1921.8 It was during 
their visits and meetings the growers became more interested in coffee cultivation. During the visits growers 
were asked to replace their aging coffee trees. Joseph Merinyo was responsible for supplying coffee seedlings 
                                                          
1 Dundas to CS June 1924, TNA 3864/2. 
2 Dundas to the Chief Secretary June 1924, TNA3864/2; DC to PC Ref. No. 23/13 of April 21st 1936, TNA 26207. 
3 Pennington Report, TNA13060, p.4 
4 Charles Dundas was the Secretary for Native Affairs from 1925 to 1929. In 1929 was appointed as Governor for the 
Bahamas. 
5 Coffee Ordinance and Regulations Attitude of the KNPA, TNA, 13060; R.J. M. Swynnerton, A .L. B. Bennett and H.B. 
Stent,All About KNCU Coffee, (Moshi: KNCU, 1948), p.4; John Illife, A Modern History of Tanganyika,(Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979),p.154. 
6 Dundas to the Chief Secretary June 1924, TNA3864/2; DC to PC Ref. No. 23/13 of April 21st 1936, TNA 26207. 
7 Charles Dundas, Africa at Crossroads, (London: Greenwood Press, 1955), p.125. 
8 Pennington Report, TNA13060,p.4 
Journal of Marketing and Consumer Research                                                                                                                                  www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2422-8451 An International Peer-reviewed Journal 
Vol.28, 2016 
 
56 
and was permitted by the DC to start nurseries with a start-up capital at a cost of only 25 rupees.1 Seedlings from 
Merinyo’s nurseries which were in Old Moshi with the help of the Chief (Mangi) Abraham of the area were sold 
to interested growers and Chiefs across the district.2At this juncture, the role played by chiefs was mobilisation 
and enforcement of coffee farming practices among its subjects. As the demand grew, Merinyo could not cope 
and chiefs were granted permission by Dundas to start nurseries in their respective areas of jurisdiction.3 The 
encouragement by Dundas from his time when he took office as the DC of Moshi, coupled with the chief’s 
enthusiasm to use their land to grow coffee led to the tremendous and rapid growth of acreage in production. 
This growth is summarised in table 1 below.  
Table 1: Number of Coffee Growers and Acreage 1923 – 1961 in Kilimanjaro 
Period (June - July) Number of growers  Acreage  
1923/24 – 1927/28 5,500 2,200 
1928/29 – 1932/33 10,700 4,500 
1933/34 – 1937/38 21,300 10,100 
1938/39 – 1942/43 26,700 15,800 
1943/44 – 1947/48 29,800 17,900 
1948/49 – 1952/53 33,000 23,500 
1953/54 – 1957/58 39,000 29,200 
1958/59 – 1960/61 44,800 33,700 
Source: Compiled from Kilimanjaro Native Planter Association and KNCU reports from 1923 - 1960 
The growing number of coffee growers and acreage in Kilimanjaro was partly the result of the DC, the 
colonial government policy, the leadership of the KNPA which was formed in 1925 and later Kilimanjaro Native 
Co-operative Union (KNCU) and its affiliated societies’ encouragement since. By 1936 the volume of coffee 
produced by growers surpassed that of the European planters.4 It has to be clear that, such expansion did not 
necessarily imply opening up new farms or additional land because coffee was often grown on the same farm 
with a banana trees under the intercropping system.    
The parallel existence of two competing agricultural sectors split between the European 
plantation/settlers and African small-scale growers led to tension. Settler farmers resented the growth of African 
coffee production and in response they exerted pressure on the colonial administration to rescind the policy 
because they believed African growers could not be entrusted with the industry due to their inexperience and a 
lack of technical knowhow. In particular, settlers argued that ‘ill-informed growers in the industry would lead to 
the spread of coffee diseases into their trees’.5 European planters attempted to displace the growers from the 
coffee industry in order to force them to become labourers in their plantations while the native growers struggled 
to maintain their economic autonomy. Yet, some of the settlers’ concerns were relevant should have been 
addressed by establishing extension services to growers such as the use of insecticides/pesticides to eliminate 
insects that were damaging coffee plants. The use of insecticides/pesticides would have eliminated without 
creating tension. In reality, the settlers’ main concern was not a fear of spread of diseases, but the shortage or 
curtailment of cheap labour in their farms as local Africans were not available to provide labour as were 
attending their own crops; and surely settler farmer resentment was also based on the fact that African farmers 
were competing with them. It was obvious that, the settlers underpaid growers for laborious and long hours farm 
work at a point where they had to concentrate in their farms where they were earning reasonable income.  
The settlers’ views were opposed not only by Dundas himself, but also, by the first British Governor of 
Tanzania, 1919-25, Sir Horace Byatt, on the basis that were not economically convincing.6 Horace Byatt, felt 
that Africans should be encouraged to utilise their land to grow coffee which was in demand in European 
markets.7 The colonial policy on the protection of the growers maintained that:  
Suppression of coffee planting was out of the question. The British government could not suppress 
development initiated by the Germans and no rules for suppression of the Native enterprise would ever 
have been permitted by the government or countenance by the League of Nation (UNO). Moreover, no 
government could set out to root up trees which had stood from 15 years and were bringing in secure 
and ample income. It is clear therefore that before the British government entered in the administration 
of Tanganyika certain of the Wachagga had already seen and experience of benefits to be derived from 
                                                          
1 Coffee Ordinance and Regulations Attitude of the KNPA, TNA 13060; (German and Indian Rupee was a currency in 
circulation until 1925 when the conversion of circulating rupees was completed and replacement by florins and shillings 
currencies which was carried out by the British colonial power East Africa Currency Board. 
2 Dundas to the Chief Secretary June 1924, TNA3864/2; DC to PC Ref. No. 23/13 of April 21st 1936, TNA 26207. 
3 Dundas to CS June 1924, TNA 3864/2. 
4 DC to PC Ref No 23/13 of April 21 1936, TNA 26207. 
5 Pennington Report, TNA13060,p.4 
6 Charles Dundas, (1955), pp. 123-25. 
7 Coffee Ordinance and Regulations Attitude of the KNPA, TNA, 13060. 
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cultivation of coffee.1 
Increasingly, the colonial government support enabled for the WaChagga to expand coffee cultivation 
further primarily geared towards fiscal advantages given the fact so as to contribute to the colony in realisation 
of financial self-sufficiency.  As a result of settler agitations the growers banded together, forming the 
Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association (KNPA), (later KNCU) in 1925 to protect their interest in coffee and 
the development of the industry and to access colonial government support including management provided by 
the colonial civil servants (see chapter four). The Association’s representatives (wawakilishi) were made 
responsible for providing practical educational instructions on coffee cultivation, spraying insecticides and 
pesticides to protect trees from being damaged and infected.  
In Kilimanjaro, coffee marketing was briefly under the control of Indians, Greeks, Missionaries and 
some civil servants before the formation of the KNPA in 1925 when the growers began to be directly involved.2 
The involvement of the KNPA in crop purchase was emulated by growers from coffee bulk marketing scheme 
which was being undertaken by the settler’s organisation, the Kilimanjaro Planters Association (KNPA). The 
association received government technical support that included developing a co-operative marketing scheme to 
help members sell their produce.3  
However, during 1925 the government withdrew its support to the KNPA. This was due to criticism 
from settlers that the colonial authority was directly engaging in business through the KNPA that forced its 
leaders who were civil servants to resign in December 7th 1925.4 Their positions were taken over by the end of 
1925 by Joseph Merinyo 5  who became its first African President and Stefano Lema as Secretary of the 
Association.6 Consequently, coffee cultivation and marketing was placed under control of Africans and the 
support from the government was maintained for example in protecting the Association from completion. The 
protection of the Association was provided with effect from April 1st 1929, when the colonial authority granted 
the coffee marketing monopoly under Section 15 of the Native Authority Ordinance No.18 of 1926. However, 
the colonial authority was not in favour of KNPA and it engineered its restructuring and take over by a newly 
formed co-operative organisation that was registered under the 1932 co-operative legislation that provided for 
compulsion coffee marketing as discussed in the following section. 
 
1.2: The 1932 Co-operative Legislation  
In 1932 co-operative legislation was passed leading to the restructuring and replacement of the KNPA by. Under 
Section 36 of this legislation growers were compelled to be members of a society primarily to deprive the KNPA 
membership as all growers had under mentioned Section of the legislation to be members of the co-operative 
societies. The growers were also compelled to sell their produce through co-operatives that deprived KNPA 
supply of coffee from African growers.  
Whereas the legislation was designed to suffocate the KNPA access to coffee produced by Africans as 
linked to marketing by the colonial authority to control coffee through co-operatives as linked to marketing by 
the colonial authority to control coffee through co-operatives; the settlers coffee producers were trapped. The 
colonial authority, however, was hesitant to apply the sections as the settlers were also supposed to abide. 
Instead, in 1934 a new legislation, the Chagga Rule; described by Coulson simply as compulsory marketing 
order7 without establishing its impact on the natives produced crops and the agriculture marketing policy as a 
whole. For example, the Chagga Rule excluded European planters, but compelled the native growers to sell their 
coffee through the KNCU. It has to be noted here that, the Chagga Rule segregated the natives from non-natives, 
mainly European planters. Strickland seems to concur with the idea as he argues that, it was unreasonable to 
expect these different types of coffee to be bulked and marketed through the same agency.8 Under the legislation 
thy sold their coffee produce through a non-native only co-operative society, the Tanganyika Coffee Growers 
Association (TCGA) which was formed in 1935 for this purpose.9 
When coffee prices fell growers rioted because under the Chagga Rule they were not free to sell their 
                                                          
1 The History of the KNPA, TNA 13060. 
2  Session a Paper No. 4, 1937, p.9; KNCU School Lyamungo, TNA 5/375C 24/13; Memorandum of 
Disturbances in the Moshi District, pp. 208 – 209, TNA 25400; Government of Tanganyika, Annual Report, 
Northern Province. (Dar Es Salaam: Government Printer, 1937), pp. 9 -10; Interview with Emanuel Kitely 
Mbowe, Joseph Mchomba, John Joseph Munishi (October 24th 2012). 
3 The History of the KNPA, TNA 13060. 
4 Extract from the Report on the Reorganisation - Pennington Report, TNA 13060; Tanganyika Territory, LEGCO, A report 
on the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union, (Dar Es Salaam, Government Printer, 1937), p.5, TNA 19005. 
5 Merinyo was a civil servant working at the Agriculture Department in Moshi District  
6 KNPA’s History, p.5, TNA 13060. 
7 Andrew Coulson, (1982), p. 62. 
8 C.F. Strickland, Co-operation in the Colonies, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1945), p.78. 
9 Tanganyika Coffee Board Meeting, Agenda and Minutes, TNA 24304. 
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coffee on the open market. In an attempt to quell the riots the government was prompted to pass yet another 
racially based legislation, the native coffee control Ordinance, No 26 of 1937 which created the government’s 
native coffee control Boards, the Moshi Native Coffee Board (MNCB) in November 1937. Consequently native 
coffee cultivation in Kilimanjaro was placed under control of the government. The MNCB’s purpose was to 
advance and improve the cultivation of coffee grown by natives through management of coffee nurseries by 
instructing growers in methods of planting, cultivation harvesting or preparation and marketing of native coffee.1 
The MNCB recruited some of wawakilishi to work as extension staff to provide guidance to growers. The 
government intervention in agriculture production was defined by the function that the marketing board had to 
play. Clearly, this did not lead to direct government involvement in production. Crop production/cultivation 
responsibility remained in the hand of growers, but under control of the colonial authority.  
The colonial authority established measures to control coffee marketing in Kilimanjaro. The policy was 
incorporated under section 36 (ii) of the 1932 Co-operative Ordinance,   which laid down that if 75 per cent of 
the producers in an area had to sell through one agent. In principle the mentioned sections formed the bedrock to 
the cash crop marketing policy in Tanzania. The legislation’s section provides also that, non-members of the 
organization are automatically members of the society and should sell to the organisation or its affiliated 
societies. It has to be noted that, this section provides for obligatory membership to all growers to a co-operative 
society contrary International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) and Rochdale voluntary co-operative principles. This 
clearly suggested a violation of the co-operative principles regardless of the pretext that it was designed to 
protect growers from unscrupulous traders and intention to develop the native coffee industry. Moreover, under 
the Sections, the growers were prohibited to sell their produce at other places than established co-operatives as a 
result it created marketing monopoly. 
Regardless of mentioned flaw, in 1933 KNCU applied from the colonial authority to employ Section 36 
(i and ii) of the co-operative legislation. 2  However, the colonial authority was hesitant to approve its 
implementation in Kilimanjaro due to the existence of both the settlers mostly Europeans and small-scale 
Chagga/native growers. The hesitation was obviously due to its impact on European coffee planters who had to 
sell their produce through the KNCU and its affiliated societies. Separate legislation was the only option to keep 
European planters safe and immune from the provision. However, implementing separate legislation was a 
violation of the Order of Mandate that prohibited racial segregation.3 For the Tanzanian colonial authority and 
particularly Strickland to have members comprising of different races and different types of coffee to be bulked 
and marketed through the same agency. 4  For Strickland this was impractical as he indicates to everyone 
throughout the world that, the provision in undisputable and the emphasis was, not only who produces; but also, 
what is produced should be separated based on race. 
In an attempt to get over such defect in the co-operative ordinance, the government had to bring 
forward a specific section for the WaChagga growers. It was decided that an ordinance, the Coffee (Moshi 
District) Rules popularly referred as the Chagga Rule or masharti in Kiswahili should be made under section 15 
of the Native Authority (NA) Ordinance.5 Accordingly, the Chagga Rules were drafted in August 1934 and 
passed on October 1st, 1934 by the Chagga Council to compel native growers to sell coffee through the KNCU.  
It has to be noted here that, the idea originated with the colonial government. However, the Chagga 
Council which was a Native Authority (NA) was persuaded by the colonial government to pass it. This 
demonstrates an attempt by the colonial government to delegate powers for promulgation of native legislations in 
accordance to the Indirect Rule policy primarily on the pretext of protecting the native coffee growers. In reality 
it was intended to protect the European settlers from being compelled to market their produce to the co-operative 
societies, the memberships of which were predominately natives. The policy was justified by the colonial 
authority as a necessary measure that;  
No satisfactory marketing arrangements can be made until every native grower is compelled to sell his 
coffee through the Association as this would eliminate the local buyers from competing with the Association. It 
also ensures that the association remained in existence.6 
It is obvious that, engagement of the NA was to keep the colonial authority from being implicated with 
racial policies which went against the Mandate policy. The Chagga Rule was rooted in racial segregation policy 
and compelled native growers only to marketing the coffee to the co-operatives. All in all, the colonial authority 
was responsible for creating racial barriers by pressuring to the NA to promulgate the legislation. In this view, 
                                                          
1 TNA 24/13 KNCU School (Lyamungo), from MNCB to the Secretariat Members of Agricultural and Natural Resource, Ref. 
No. 75/273, February 20th 1954 
2 KNCS to Chief Secretary in April 22rd 1932 signed by Joseph Maliti (President), Stepano Lema (Secretary) and A.B. 
Bennett (Manager), TNA 20378. 
3 Extract from Lord Winster in his speech March 1, 2 or 3 to the House of Lords, TNA 357883. 
4 C.F. Strickland, (1945), p.78. 
5 Legislation on Control Native Agriculture and Industry, History of the Chagga Rule, TNA 25038. 
6 Report on the Reorganisation of the KNPA, TNA 13060. 
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the NA and Chiefs found themselves embroiled in the affairs of growers and societies without their participation.  
The employment of the Rule coincided with the collapse of the coffee price in the world market in 
which Kilimanjaro especially the Wachagga coffee was not spared. Table 13 below shows a decline and decrease 
of coffee paid to growers. In 1934/35 coffee season suffered a drastic fall of coffee price in the world market 
triggered by the flooding in the market of the produce from Brazil.1 Table 2 below shows a decline and increase 
of coffee price paid to growers. 
Table 2: Coffee Production and Amount Paid to the KNCU (1932 – 1946) 
Season Coffee crop parchment (in 
tons) 
Total amount paid in 
£ to growers 
Price per lb. paid to growers  
1932/33 1,072 35,426 29.55 
1933/34 1,167 35,384 27.03 
1934/35 1,587 35,456 19.85 
1935/36 1,684 33,995 16.94 
1936/37 882 18,707 18.95 
1937/38 1,472 33,336 20.16 
1938/39 1,959 58,747 26.78 
1939/40 2,680 72,275 24.17 
1940/41 4,063 84,798 18.53 
1941/42 1,948 52,184 23.97 
1942/43 3,103 145,399 41.96 
1943/44 2,114 131,012 57.49 
1944/45 3,974 276,380 62.96 
1945/46 3.102 173,032 49.81 
Total 30,807 1,186,131  
Source: Moshi District Book I 1939/40 to 1943/44 and the KNCU 1946/47 Annual Report, Appendix B 
Table 2 above shows payment trends in which 1934/35 season advances paid were only -/16 cents per 
lb. (pound) of parchment coffee delivered. 2 It shows a sharp fall in 1935. The crisis was so serious that the 
KNCU could not pay growers a second instalment (‘mabaki’ in Kiswahili). The KNCU issued a communiqué 
through the KNCU’s Monthly bulletin, the Uremi on 22nd August 1935 of the members on impending problem 
that could not sell most of coffee in London market.3 However, the message did not show why coffee could not 
fetch a buyer and the reason for the fall of prices. However, the growers showed trust in the KNCU and there 
was not reaction from them. At the same time the KNCU had to embark upon measures to resolve financial 
problems to meet its commitments to pay growers in 1934/35 season.  
On the other hand, the settlers, especially of German origin, were not affected by the crisis since they 
exported their coffee directly to German and fetched a higher price that was fully paid in cash. At the same time 
there were several traders, mostly Asian, German and British settlers, missionaries and traders paid better prices 
than the Union. For example, the KNCU paid 15 cents per a lb. While such companies as Sheriff Jiwa paid 20 
cents and H. Bueb paid 21 to 25 cents, depending on the quality of the delivered coffee.4 The German settlers 
offered between 10 and 15 per cent above the market price on condition that part of the payment was spent to 
purchase agricultural implements that they were selling5 and exported coffee to Germany. 6 In this effect, the 
growers demanded to sell coffee wherever and to anyone provided s/he is ready to pay them well and promptly.7  
Therefore, growers could not see the KNCU justification for paying them low prices.  For them, they 
felt that they were being cheated.  This generated criticism and by November 1936 growers/members had lost 
patience and pressed for implementation of various alternatives to resolve the problem; first, that they pull out of 
the KNCU for open market alternative where they could fetch better price; and secondly, removal of societies 
leaders from office for failure to defend their interests and welfare in the Union forums. The societies in question 
were Machame Central and East, Marangu Central and East but the members alternatives were dismissed by the 
KNCU because they were contrary to the Chagga Rule.8 The permission was briefly granted by the end of 1935 
                                                          
1 T.S. Jervis, ‘Marketing of Coffee’ in the East Africa Agricultural Journal, May 1957, pp.459- 464, in Bukoba District Book. 
2 Uremi, August, 22nd 1935. 
3 Uremi on 22nd August 1935. 
4 Coffee Ordinance and Regulations Attitude of the KNPA: History of the KNPA, TNA 13060.  
5 Lord Hailey, An African Survey: A study of Problems Arising in Africa South of Sahara, (London: Oxford University Press, 
1938), pp.1472 -1473. 
6 W.K.H Campbell, Practical Co-operation in Asian and Africa, (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons ltd., 1951), p. 196. 
7 Lord Hailey, An African Survey: A study of Problems Arising in Africa South of Sahara, (London: Oxford University Press, 
1938), pp.1472 -1473. 
8 Bennett to Chief Shangali of Machame and Marrealle of Marangu, Folio 34, TNA 5/243. 
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but was cancelled before a start of 1937 coffee marketing season. 1  This fuelled further discontent and 
dissatisfaction amongst the WaChagga coffee growers. It was pointed out that discontent was widespread over 
the whole mountainside engineered by some individuals; 2  but more so in Machame Central and East and 
Marangu East societies that composed of about 3,784 members in all and owned 24 per cent of the total crop 
produced in Kilimanjaro. 3 On September 15th 1937 riots broke out in these societies. Between September 16 to 
17th 1937 there was riots in Marangu East, where growers replaced existing leaders with members who ‘refused 
to recognise the existing by-laws’.4 
The riots popularly referred to by growers as ‘Coffee Riots’ also occurred in 27 other primary societies 
in Lyamungo, Masama, and Machame North. During the riots the primary society’s stores were ransacked.5 The 
rioters complained that owing to heavy overhead expenses the Union paid lower prices than they could obtain 
outside.6 The Chiefs were also accused by growers of conspiring in the passage of the Chagga Rule; therefore the 
Chiefs were viewed as being against their economic interests and welfare. 
The government restored order by drafting in the police and air force. 7  Around 70 rioters were 
apprehended and sentenced to jail.8 Some of the ring leaders were imprisoned and about 14 others were deported 
to Singida, Iringa and Sumbawanga in the Southern highlands of Tanzania.9 The KNCU also suspended sending 
money to all societies where riots had taken place.10 These actions were intended to ensure that growers accepted 
the coffee price paid by KNCU regardless of how low it was. These measures to reinforce Section 36 of the 1932 
co-operative legislation sought to secure the loyalty of members of co-operative movement through force.  
Other societies disaffiliated from the KNCU over its failure to meet its obligations.11 This created an 
impasse that forced the PC and Moshi’s DC to intervene. The PC had meetings in Marangu and Machame which 
successfully ended by restoration of societies’ committees.12 In 1939 efforts were initiated by the Moshi District 
officer, Mr Bruce Hunt for reorganisation of such societies and get them back to the KNCU framework. In one 
instance the DO wrote13 to Mangi Addiel Solomon of Mwika asking him to facilitate the exercise for West 
Mwika Primary Co-operative Society which was in his Chiefdom.  
It was viewed by the colonial administrators that the riots were politically motivated because of a 
number of the German settlers, about 882 in total for the whole district and Missionaries in the area. The 
accusation against the traders illustrates the belief that the growers were too ignorant to protest and on the same 
premise were expected to be obedient to the Chagga Rule. In an investigation of the causes of the riots it was 
reported by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Mr. R.C Northcote, that they were instigated by the agitators, 
mostly Asian traders  as well as German settlers, Greeks, teachers and missionaries14 who exploited the poor 
price paid by the KNCU as an avenue for them to accumulate coffee.  
Additionally, Northcote’s accusations about the riots have been linked to Germany’s campaigns for the 
return of some of her colonies which were mentioned by Hitler in conversations with Sir John Simon on March 
25, 1935. At the same time Germany was lobbying victor power to be considered for membership in the League 
of Nations so that it could qualify to administer colonies. However, did Britain rejected Germany’s proposal, as 
                                                          
1 Tanganyika Territory, LEGCO, A report on the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union, (Dar Es Salaam, Government 
Printer, 1937), p.9 TNA 19005. 
2 Tanganyika Territory, LEGCO, A report on the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union, (Dar Es Salaam, Government 
Printer, 1937), a speech to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies from the President of the KNCU, Appendix J, p.59, TNA 
19005. 
3 Tanganyika Territory, LEGCO, A report on the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union, (Dar Es Salaam, Government 
Printer, 1937), p.9, TNA 19005. 
4 Tanganyika Territory, LEGCO, A report on the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union, (Dar Es Salaam, Government 
Printer, 1937), p.9, TNA 19005. 
5 Tanganyika Territory, LEGCO, A report on the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union, (Dar Es Salaam, Government 
Printer, 1937), p.9 
6 Lord Hailey, An African Survey: A study of Problems Arising in Africa South of Sahara, (London: Oxford University Press, 
1938), p.1472. 
7 Interview with Edwin Mtei, March 20th 2014. 
8  PC, Northern Province to CS, Re. No. 377/7/180, November 10th 1941, MNCB Vol.II, TNA 255442; 
Disturbances at Moshi in Connection to KNCU, TNA 25400. 
9 Report to the League of Nations on Tanganyika Territory, 1937, TNA 5/243 pp. 206-13; PC, Northern Province 
to CS, Ref. No. 25442/30 December 22nd 1937, TNA 25442. 
10 Tanganyika Territory LEGCO, A Report on the KNCU, (Dar Es Sa salaam: Government Printer, 1937), p. 9 TNA 19005. 
11 Government of Tanganyika, Annual Report, Northern Province. (Dar Es Salaam: Government Printer, 1937), p. 40. 
12 Tanganyika Territory LEGCO, A Report on the KNCU, (Dar Es Sa salaam: Government Printer, 1937), p. 9 TNA 19005. 
13 DO to Mangi of Mwika Abdiel Solomon, Ref. No. 237/7 June 29th 1939, TNA 25777. 
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by returning its former colonies Britain would have been sacrificing sources of raw materials and foodstuff 
supply to a potential enemy. Lord Winster in his speech to the House of Lords misleadingly asserted that one of 
the reasons for the riots was the failure to educate the members of the Union in co-operative principles,1 which 
led members to refuse to adhere to the society by-laws.2 The KNCU reacted by suspending such societies and 
suspended coffee payments, advances though the Chagga Rule was applicable.3  
In a communiqué the DC informed and ordered the members to re-join the society which was the only 
option available for them to sell their 1939 produce.4 This was clear government interference and an obvious 
compulsion that became a dominant factor. It was stressed that its only if a society affiliated back to the Union 
could they sell produce in accordance to the law. This message was communicated in Kiswahili that ‘ni lazima 
wafahamu ya kwamba ni lazima wote wawe chini ya masharti ya KNCU na basi hawataweza kukifungua chama 
chao na Union’ through a memo read aloud by the Mangi at a growers meeting held on July 1st 1939.  
At the meeting the Mangi managed to convince his subjects convinced and it was decided to elect new 
leadership ‘dedicated’ and committed to comply with the KNCU by laws. Marua bin Kishimbo was elected as 
Chairperson, Abel bin Maktano, the vice-Chairperson and Yohanne bin Manaseh as Secretary. 5 To this effect 
Mangi asked the DO to restore West Mwika Primary Co-operative Society into the list of the KNCU affiliated 
societies; and asked for permission for that case to have the society’s office opened for business to serve his 
subjects. A decision to elect new faces by rejecting the old ones to take society’s office was translated by Mangi 
Abdiel Solomon as a significant step towards restoration of confidence in the Union6 at a point where growers 
had lost trust on it. However, it should be highlighted that affiliation was initiated by the Chiefs and government, 
which demonstrates a lack of member agency.  
 
1.3: The 1937 Native Coffee (Control and Marketing) Ordinance  
As a result of the riots the government decided to alter how it exercised control over the native coffee industry. 
In October 1937 the Native Coffee (Control and Marketing) Ordinance No 26 was passed to replace the Chagga 
Rule. The Ordinance provided for the control of the native coffee industry and compulsory marketing of the 
produce, but it did not compel growers to sell their produce through a specific organisation. Promulgation of a 
new policy can, therefore, be viewed as a victory for the growers. But it was embarrassing to Chiefs and central 
government when the Chagga Rule was revoked by the Governor on December 21st, 1937 in response to the 
recommendation made by a committee that was formed to investigate the crisis/riots that faced the KNCU.7  
Nevertheless, the legislation did not make a significant departure from the Chagga Rule as it restricted 
growers from selling coffee to the open market. The important contrast with the Chagga Rule in the Native 
Coffee Ordinance was that did not specify to which organization the growers were compelled to sell their 
produce, but only mentioned an agency that the Board may suggest. In Moshi the KNCU was recommended. 
KNCU maintained its monopoly over native produced coffee because it was the only coffee marketing 
organization in Moshi due to the Chagga Rule. This provided an indirect integration of the co-operatives into 
marketing policy. Similarly, no organisation apart from the KNCU and affiliated societies was allowed to 
operate coffee marketing in the district.  
The legislation targeted Native coffee growers and ensured that European growers were not compelled 
to sell their produce through the KNCU and its affiliated societies. Thus, the native coffee industry was one that 
was brought under more direct control than that attainable by Co-operative Societies Ordinance Section 36 (i), 
which required the compulsory sale of produce through a registered society.  The Ordinance led to the formation 
of the MNCB, in which under Section 6 all producers of native coffee in the Moshi District were compelled to 
sell coffee produce to the agency chosen by the Board.   
Under the native coffee (control and Marketing) legislations the MNCB became a sole buyer of native 
produced coffee and it was empowered to appoint an agent/s. As a result, legal ground was provided for 
application of section 6 that appointed the KNCU as the agent of the MNCB which was set up in November 20 th 
1937.8 Under the monopoly system provided under the legislation growers had no choice or alternative sell their 
produce other than co-operatives. Clearly, upon appointment of the KNCU by the MNCB it was integrated into 
the government marketing machinery. This illustrates that, the KNCU was created and organised by the 
                                                          
1 Extract from Lord Winster in his speech March 1, 2 or 3 to the House of Lords, TNA 357883. 
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5 Mangi of Mwika, Abdiel Solomon to DO, Ref. No. L. 9/6/39 July 14th 1939, TNA 25777. 
6 Mangi of Mwika, Abdiel Solomon to DO, Ref. No. L. 9/6/39 July 14th 1939, TNA 25777. 
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government so that to facilitate coffee handling and marketing under legal protection. Thus, this does not imply 
KNCU was an independent business entity, but became the government facilitating machinery for handling the 
coffee produced by the native growers.  
This clearly demonstrates that the co-operative legislation violated the voluntary co-operative principles. 
However, it was justified by the colonial authority as necessary measure that, ‘no satisfactory marketing 
arrangements can be made until every native grower is compelled to sell his coffee through the Association.1 A 
compulsion measure was pursued by the government on view that the members would remain loyal due to the 
KNPA and later KNCU’s efforts to defend growers from coffee growing suppression attempts by the settlers, but 
the introduction of the policy was ill timed as it coincided with coffee prices plummeting.  
A three tier marketing system was established whereby primary societies were at the bottom, KNCU in 
the middle and the MNCB at the top of the structure.  Under the system primary societies collected the produce 
from growers and sold it to the KNCU which forwarded them to the Board. This was applauded by the 
Agriculture Secretariat, who pointed out that ‘the MNCB now has a weapon to use’.2 This illustrates the colonial 
authority had meant for the economic subjugation of the growers. It was also pointed out that the Chagga Rule 
was an embarrassment as it had placed the NAs on the same footing as the Department of State. 3  The 
establishment of the MNCB rendered the Chagga Rule inoperative.  
The replacement of the Chagga Rule was considered as a decisive step in restoring growers’ confidence 
in Chiefs and the NA and thereafter no immediate challenge to their authority arose. This could be explained by 
the intimidation growers experienced when the government intervened to quell the riots. Of course, although the 
legislation replaced the Chagga Rule it strengthened government's grip over the KNCU, and ultimately the 
affiliated societies and growers through the MNCB. The control of marketing by the Boards implied that co-
operatives were denied the necessary independence to operate as member controlled organisations that became a 
dominant and a permanent feature in agricultural marketing in Tanzania throughout colonial era.  
 
1.4: The Defence Ordinance and Orders  
Moreover, following the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, the colonies were required to ensure they 
supply coffee to the British’s Ministry of Food under a long-term contract provided under the Defence 
Ordinance and Orders of 1939 and 1940. This was implemented through the marketing boards or co-operative 
societies in which purchase was in fixed quantities; and prices were low that were fixed and reviewed on a year-
to-year basis4 as per Section 7 of the contract.5 Under the contract the MNCB supplied coffee between 1940 and 
1952 to the Ministry of Food. In that effect, the KNCU also became an agent for the Ministry of Food during this 
period and was required to supply 4,000 tons annually.6  Thus, the Defence Ordinance and Orders reinforced 
further the control and compulsion marketing of the existing coffee produced by natives.   
To avoid future unrest the growers were kept well informed by Provincial officials, especially, the 
Provincial Commissioner (PC), Mr C.F. Hallier, about this new development and the appointment of the KNCU 
as MNCB’s agent. Such information was communicated to growers in public meetings and articles in Uremi. 
The PC made tours in Kilimanjaro where he informed chiefs and growers in meetings on the government 
decision to abolish the Chagga Rule. He also informed them of setting up of the Moshi Native Coffee Marketing 
Board whereby KNCU would be appointed as its agent.7 This announcement was met with great satisfaction by 
growers because it was interpreted as a sign that the government was ready to listen and implement their 
concerns. Chiefs were equally pleased as they had long been conscious of the anomaly of their positions as 
sponsor of the Rule which brought them into conflict with their subjects. 8  Due to meetings and Uremi 
publication of articles the PC concluded that ‘the withdrawal of the Chagga Rule and its replacement by the 
MNCB are fully and widely understood in Kilimanjaro’.9  
Coincidentally, the setting up of the statutory board, the MNCB came at a time when the coffee price 
was improving and generated and restored confidence of both co-operatives and the board to growers (see Table 
2 above). It was the view of the government officials that such development was met with great satisfaction since 
                                                          
1 Coffee Ordinance and Regulations: Attitude of the KNPA in Report on the Reorganisation of the KNPA, TNA 13060. 
2 Secretariat to PC, Northern Province, Ref. No. 25442/30, December 22nd 1937, TNA 25442. 
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it was seen as protection of growers’ interest as well as of their organization by the government.1  Importantly, 
unlike Chagga rule the MNCB members were drawn from the government and growers as well as co-operative 
societies2 of which growers felt were represented. Interestingly, one of the deportees was appointed one as the 
Board member.  
 
1.5: Conclusion 
This paper has shown concerted efforts to rejuvenate coffee industry in the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro as part 
of the colonial authority’s drive to attain financial self-sufficiency. Agricultural production policies and 
implementation went hand in hand with the consolidation of marketing through the compulsion legislations 
under which the growers had to sell their coffee through the agency (societies) appointed by the Board, a feature 
that dominated for decades. The post-riots era and legislation saw the colonial authority being directly involved 
through the MNCB in which those who did not adhere were liable to penalty or imprisonment or both under the 
Native Coffee Ordinance of 1937. Under the legislation the marketing and control boards was formed that 
established the colonial hegemony over small scale native coffee growers and provided the basis for the 
government to extract surplus from coffee marketing. Under the legislation, the boards were granted the 
monopoly over the handling and export of coffee produced by the native and the co-operative societies in 
Kilimanjaro. In this regard, the co-operative movement became part of the government machinery for organising 
the compulsion marketing of native produced coffee. Under the policy the autonomous foundation for the co-
operative movement’s bargaining role was undermined as the co-operatives became the agents of the marketing 
boards that created suppressive, exploitative and compulsion economic relationship that is further explored in 
next papers on Tanzania’s coffee and cotton bulk purchase during and post-second world war as well as post-war 
co-operative development. 
 
 
                                                          
1 PC, Northern Province to CS, Confidential, Ref. No. 377/7/96, December 28th 1937, TNA 25442. 
2 PC, Northern Province to CS, Confidential, Ref. No. 377/7/96, December 28th 1937, TNA 25442. 
